Seven years after 72 people died in the Grenfell Tower disaster, the public inquiry has said that “systemic dishonesty” contributed to the horrific fire.
Its report laid bare years of missed opportunities to prevent the catastrophe and how those responsible for fire safety were at risk of being compromised by commercial interests.
Here are some of the key takeaways from the 1,670-page report into the UK’s deadliest residential fire since the Second World War.
‘Systemic dishonesty’ about panels and insulation
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry report said a “very significant reason” why the building came to be clad in combustible materials was “systemic dishonesty” on the part of those who made and sold panels and insulation products.
“They engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market,” the report said.
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‘We want changes and justice’
The report singled out Arconic Architectural Products, which it said “deliberately concealed from the market” the true extent of the danger of using its Reynobond 55 PE rainscreen panels which were installed on the external wall of the tower.
It also pointed the finger at Celotex, which manufactured the combustible RS5000 foam insulation. It said the company “embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market”.
Exhibits from the investigation into the fire. Pic: PA
Regulation at the time was ‘seriously defective’
The system of regulating the construction and refurbishment of high-rise residential buildings that was in place at the time of the disaster was “seriously defective in a number of respects”, the report said.
It added the government failed to actively monitor that system and ensure that dangers of which it became aware were communicated to industry.
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Conflicts of interest in the system
The report also dug into the “inappropriate relationship” between approved inspectors and those they were inspecting.
“Approved inspectors had a commercial interest in acquiring and retaining customers that conflicted with the performance of their role as guardians of the public interest,” it said.
It pointed to the Building Research Establishment, which held a trusted position within the construction industry, saying that its systems were “not robust enough to ensure complete independence”.
“As a result, it sacrificed rigorous application of principle to its commercial interests,” the report said.
This underlying conflict of interest, the inquiry said, will continue to exist and continue to threaten the integrity of the system, meaning that change is needed.
Grenfell Tower lit up for the seventh anniversary of the tragedy
Governments knew of risks for years
Successive governments had 26 years following a serious fire at an 11-storey tower block in Merseyside in 1991 to identify the risks posed by combustible cladding panels and insulation and take action, the inquiry found.
“Indeed, by 2016 the department was well aware of those risks, but failed to act on what it knew,” it said.
The report said the government failed to heed a warning by the Environment and Transport Select Committee in 1999 that it should not take a deadly fire for steps to be taken to minimise the risks posed by some external cladding systems.
Candles with the names of the victims were lit during a memorial service. Pic: PA
‘Uncaring and bullying’
There was also criticism of the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), which was responsible for running services at Grenfell Tower.
Relations between the TMO and residents “were increasingly characterised by distrust, dislike, personal antagonism and anger” and “some, perhaps many, occupants of the tower regarded the TMO as an uncaring and bullying overlord that belittled and marginalised them”.
It said there was a “toxic atmosphere fuelled by mistrust of both sides” but there was a “serious failure” by the TMO in allowing the relationship to deteriorate to such an extent.
The TMO and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea were jointly responsible for managing fire safety at Grenfell Tower – but the years between 2009 and 2017 were marked by a “persistent indifference to fire safety”, the report said.
Call for better regulation
One of the foremost recommendations in the report was for a single independent body to regulate the industry and drive “much-needed change”, and that this body should report to a single government secretary of state.
Its functions would include things like regulating construction products, testing and certification, licensing of contractors to work on higher-risk buildings, carrying out research and accrediting fire risk assessors.
The inquiry also recommended that the secretary of state to whom this body would report should have a chief construction adviser with sufficient budget and staff to advise on all matters.
It also called for the profession of fire engineer, which does not currently need a formal qualification to practise, be formally recognised and the title and function protected by statute.
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